Image linked to donate page Image linked to Countering the Militarisation of Youth website (external link) Image linked to webshop

Connexion utilisateur

Interface language

Diaspora link
Facebook link link
Twitter link

On recruitment in Bogotá


You say you know Colombia very well. What about Bogotá?
I know Bogotá very well, but the problem is not just Bogotá...first of all, Bogotá has to be cleaned out of all militia. And in Cundinamarca the work localized in regions where there is influence of illegal armed groups needs to be consolidated. That way, Cundinamarca can become a model region. In short terms, guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug dealers need to be out.
The approach would solve it all. But, is this proposal possible?
It is not an issue solved with just words; this also requires time. The most important thing is getting help from civil society, which is the population directly related to the social network from where the army gains its success.
Without the civilian population's support success is not possible?
Exactly, civilian society is to the army what water is to fish.
Let's talk about where Bogotá's critical problems are localized.
Usme (a poverty stricken district in Bogotá) is an example of a place where work has to be done with the community and civil authorities. It is work that is going to gain momentum little by little. It is not just Bogotá's problem but also a problem associated with all the big cities in the world. Usme requires the practice of methodological work and it has to include education as a fundamental element[1]

Bogotá: a context that favors the war

To explain the context of the capital of Colombia and its imminent relation with the militarization and especially recruitment, it is necessary to clarify that Bogotá's context not only follows those tendencies presented at the national level but is also affected by circumstances that not only influence the transformation of the city, but also affect initiatives of transnational character and interests of foreign countries that affect the legislative, military, economic, social and cultural order of our country. Many times, these conditions benefit from the conflict that in urban settings generates the ideal conditions that guarantee the presence of this form of context and development.

The principal aim of these external interests is the social control of a considerable part of the inhabitants, by means of a series of mechanisms, including the military, which plays a leading role in fulfilling a determinant function as an instrument of permanent control and as a body that can facilitate initiatives of governmental and economic order.

One of Bogotá's characteristics related directly to recruitment is the increasingly large number of displaced people. According to an article in El Tiempo, each day, approximately 20 families come to Bogotá as displaced citizens, who are mainly re-located in Cazucá's sectors: Ciudad Bolivar, Usme, San Cristobal, Kennedy and Soacha. It is these locations in which irregular recruitment and police repression take place and where State security measures are incorporated inflicted against the civilian population.[2]

The young men of age for recruitment residing in the sectors previously mentioned have "learned" to coexist with the irregular recruitment to such a point that they have started assuming the above mentioned practice as something normal. Their only option for having some kind of protection is to hide from the army, which demonstrates a palpable ignorance of their rights. Since irregular recruitment is a critical phenomenon in the city, a major emphasis will be placed on this subject matter as we continue.

Another characteristic of this context favorable to recruitment is the poverty in which most of the juvenile population lives. Living in conditions of poverty make these youth very susceptible to guerrillas, paramilitaries and the military or police institutions as these groups become a default option and provide possible employment[3].

This characteristic of the context is targeted by campaigns sponsored by diverse sectors of those in power looking to consolidate the police and the army as two suitable institutions for the development of employment and professional life. The mass media is also used to, advertise in favor of such institutions and effectively silences any denouncements made about the State Forces violations of Human Rights, forms of corruption and/or any links those institutions may have with paramilitaries and key sectors of power.

"The arms race is exalted by the official propaganda that heightens the value of the military uniform and the use of weapons, in such a way that for many teenagers the difference between being in an illegal group or enlisting in the regular army is not clear. One can thus affirm that this official propaganda also serves illegal groups for their recruitment purposes, since it propagates a form of generic advertising for war. The above-mentioned studies also show that the motivation behind wanting to join is not because individuals have patriotic ideals or desires to defend the State but are encouraged by the possibility of finding an occupation. "

Both mentioned characteristics are juxtaposed with cultural factors, evident in the fact that the army is viewed as an untouchable institution that promotes a strong value system and provides the necessary discipline so that young boys can successfully become men. Moreover, there are other adjacent factors marked by the negligence of public schools, as they limit themselves to simply play the role of spectators while obligatory recruitment for the military takes place. These public schools fail to provide the bare minimal amount of support and/or advice on the details of the recruitment process, allowing for consistant irregularities such as the incorporation into armed groups of young men who are exempt or have postponed their enlistment under Law 48 of 93.

Budget for the security of Bogotá

Bogotá is the city that allocates the most funds to maintain strong security policies. Its status as the country's capital and its role as the financial, political and administrative epicenter of the nation come with obligations to guarantee protection and security. This results in the city allocating an enormous budget destined to support and strengthen the police units and State control in addition to supporting systems of private security, with the end goal of creating a general sensation of safety and stability that reflects a favorable image before the national and international public.

According to Bogotá's Comptroller, this city inverts more than 6 million pesos (Colombian currency) in security [4]. The district itself only contributes 2% of this amount and the nation and its citizens give the remaining 98%. In 2005, for example, "Bogotá spent $6.5 billion in security, $ 5.9 billion (91.4%) were given by its citizens in equipment and private security services; $431 billion were given by the nation (6.6%), and $130 billion by the district (2%)"[5].

Distribution of security expenses in Bogotá
Graph. Distribution of security expenses in Bogotá
Source: Comptroller General's Office-Bogotá Bogotá

In addition, it is necessary to clarify that the money funded by citizens for security is larger than the 91.4 % stated by the office of the Comptroller, as the funds contributed by the nation and district are collected from a portion of the taxes paid by citizens.

A clear militaristic policy is an undercurrent in this active participation of citizens funding security that has been in place during the last several years, which requires the principal cities of the country to be financially sustained according to their own security policy. This strategy makes it possible for the State to invest its own security funds in other territories where national security was practically nonexistent.

The comptroller's report states that Bogotá's citizens invest $3,237,076,212 pesos (1,131,845 Euros) in private security. This statistic includes the legally registered companies as well as those that function without proper licenses. The legally established companies employ around 115,859 people who fulfill some form of security enforcement, whereas companies that function illegal employ around 150,000 to 180,000 people.

On the other hand, Bogotá relies on a total of 14,110 policemen, 4,125 of which are Auxiliary Graduates and the remaining 9,985 are professional policemen. In 2006, the workforce was increased to a high of 16,490 policemen including graduates and professionals. In 2005 Bogotá's police department demanded an investment of $ 167,365,956 pesos (58.520 Euros) and estimated that for the year 2010, the figure would increase to $351,251,410 pesos (122,815 Euros).[6]

Besides the legal and illegal private security and that provided by the police department, Bogotá relies on three national army brigades to provide security in the city. In 2005, these brigades requested an investment of $ 133,754,900 pesos (46,767 Euros).[7]

By observing these financial costs behind Bogotá's safety, it becomes evident that recruitment carried out by military and police forces continues to be more and more effective; and also that the major form of recruitment that gives sustenance to the first, happens in people's mind and in the citizen's actions, who, as seen in the data, provide 91.4 % of the security budget for Bogotá.

To sum up, the evident reality of the city can serve as the blueprint of the country, in which the imagined sense of security and the increased militarization has extended rigorously into the same society that ironically provides the maximum quota for security policies in Bogotá.

Recruitment of children, young women and men by different illegal groups in Bogotá

To describe local recruitment, it is necessary to first specify the ways in which children, young men, and women are involved, voluntarily or not, in the armed conflict.

Clearly, children, young men and women within the armed conflict carry and use weapons, however, they are not limited solely to this function. The armed groups also rely on these groups to support them with various tasks such as cooking, purchasing goods, gathering information, carrying messages, providing sexual services, recruiting other young individuals, manufacturing mines, and looking after kidnapped persons among other tasks.

These young individuals who, in the aforementioned roles, are indirectly linked to the conflict, are referred to as "little bells" by the paramilitary because they are used as alarm clocks. The army calls the teenagers "boys of steel", and the children are called "baby chicks of steel ". The guerrilla refers to them as "bees" or "little carts".[8]

State forces in Bogotá, (especially in locations such as Ciudad Bolivar, San Cristobal, Usme, Kennedy and Soacha) use children, young men and women to serve as informants, loaders, spies and patrollers. Ideologies that portray military as positive and its soldiers as heroes, the internalizing of values related to warfare, promises of money and/or objects of value, are all mechanisms used by armed groups, including those that represent the State, in order to tie children and young men and women with an armed group.

In spite of the legal prohibitions that make recruiting or involving individuals under 18-years-old in the war, there exist community and civil society programs where children, young men and women are indirectly linked to military actions. In civilian-military campaigns, both the army and the police recruit children and young adults to promote military values. In these cases, these children and young adults are uniformed, despite the serious risk that this raises for them as they are often used in war zones. In spite of the recommendations made by the Human Rights Ombudsman Office, the National Army has developed campaigns such as " Soldier for one day " and " Jr. Sword Club ", where they look for "the integration of children and young men and women, between the 5 and 16 years of age into the Army, through fun activities and by minors visiting military facilities of the country[9]

In schools that offer basic education located in the marginal sectors of the city, the army and the police develop "psychological actions" and activities that are geared towards achieving military purposes with the civilian population through education, recreation, military instruction and the establishment of military bases for security activities. Similarly, within Bogotá's educational system, and even in the whole country, there are schools and military academies that offer primary and secondary education and offer a "Technical Graduate with Military Orientation " degree. Inside these colleges, ninth tenth, and eleven graders, give military service in a special function, which includes 1,300 hours of military instruction and 3 exercises of campaign during these three years. After completing this, the young men obtain a First Class Military Card. This means that they are considered equal to any soldier of the Motherland, given that they have received training in different fields, and gained the status as a lawful combatant.[10].

Human Rights Watch reported that recruitment of children and young adults by the guerrilla and paramilitary increased significantly during the last years and that at least one of every four illegal soldiers in Colombia is under 18-years-old and that the majority of them come from poor families.

In Bogotá, especially in sectors where the number of newly arrived people displaced by violence increases daily, the United Self-defenses of Colombia (AUC) continue to recruit minors. "In Soacha and in the poor zones in the south of Bogotá, they are massively recruiting youngsters into the AUC, the illegal armed group whom the government officially made peace with. According to the Two Worlds Foundation in the southern sectors of Bogotá there are constant denouncements made regarding the pressures that stem from armed groups, in particular the paramilitaries". In this zone the AUC " pays a child or young male or female 100.000 pesos (35 Euros) monthly if they register as an informant and 400.000 pesos (140 Euros) to those who agree to take part in "social cleansing" operations[11]

Irregularities performed by the National Army when recruiting young individuals in Bogotá

1. Description of the actual process

Within the recruitment process exercised by the Army, irregularities refer to all actions that go against the legal norms related to the defined military situation of Colombians.

Colombians are required through a constitutional amendment, to define their military service status. This amendment has been defined and stipulated in various laws and implemented by bills and resolutions through the Defense Ministry.

Defining military service status means one of two things: 1) At the end of this process the young man is incorporated into a module to give the military service that the law imposes, or 2) At the end of this process this young man has been classified as exempt and he must pay some kind of quota to the military. In both cases, the young man is granted a military card that has certain effects on civilian life.

The process of defining a military status starts with registration, making the next step of exams a legal second step, followed by the lottery (available only if there is no scarcity of young individuals in line), and the final convocation in a few days where all the young individuals are united. This is when it is decided whether this young person will have to serve in the military or will be granted the status as "remainder" who can pay in monetary value for the military card.

During this process, youngsters who refuse to support the war have extensions and postponing options as legal tools granted by the legal system. They also have political tools through their public declarations as conscientious objectors that do not necessarily hold any legal grounds but bring forth a very valuable social and political accompaniment.

due process flowchart for Colombians called up for military service
Figure. Due Process and possible legal situations according to the law 48 of 2003 and legal and political instruments for refusing to provide military service.

2. The main anomalies found in the process of the definition of military service status.

Although in Bogotá ACOOC doesn't have a legal office, we have received, advised and systematized various cases of young people who have concerns and questions about military service as well as cases in which those refusing to participate in the war have been made vulnerable when exercising that right. In the development of this work we have noticed that the majority of the cases are related to violations of the due process established by the legislation.

2.1. "Batidas"

Batidas is a practice that violates the due process afforded by the Constitution to define your military service, the right to mobility, and is a clear abuse of authority. In consists of detaining young people in the streets and demanding that they present their military ID card--those who fail to present it are loaded onto a truck and immediately incorporated in the military.

According to the law, the military is able to force young people to register; nonetheless, the "batidas" is not a form of legal registration, but an immediate incorporation into the military. This illegal process omits the stages required by law before status is defined regarding military service and it denies the individual's right to access resources which can facilitate a postponement or an exemption (see figure 1).

2.2 Incorporation of Persons qualified as exempted or deferred.

Married or living in civil union: These individuals are exempt from having to serve in the military, however they are still recruited. An example of this case is found in the situation of Jhon Héctor Alfonso Moreno who was detained in a batida and who was given only an hour to prove his state of being married and father of a child of 6 months old. Since he couldn't prove it within the time frame, they sent him to Casanare that same day, without allowing him any communication with his family. The petitions, sent to the corresponding authorities, don't have been answered till now. The boys continues incorporated and was moved to the 'Batallon de Infantería de Selva' in the department Vichada, fulfilling already 11 months of being incorporated.

Displaced people: There are many individuals who are living as displaced people and who qualify for exemption, nonetheless, they continue to be incorporated in the military even when they present official documents that legitimize their testimonies.

This is the case of Wilmer David Pérez Pérez, victim of forced displacement, to whom only after 10 months of staying in the service battalion no. 13 "Cacique Tisquesusa", his condition of displaced was recognized, in spite of the right of petition and proves which were handed over to the authorities.[12].

Students: Young men above the age of 18 who are completing their high school diploma or higher education qualify to postpone their service in the military. However, batidas take place during night school hours and students over the age of 18 are taken.

Those with a sibling in the military: The Cortés brothers, who besides being displaced were also students, nonetheless, were recruited at the same time even though the law grants one of them the right to defer.

Physical or mental limitations: Recruited in a batida, Hugo Ernesto Barragán Moreno was sent to Casanare where medical examinations declared him capable of providing military service, despite the fact that he had difficulty breathing because of a rib that oppresses his chest since an accident he had during his adolescence. He fainted while in the battlefield and they started taking his warnings as a serious matter. He was released from the barracks and qualified to be able to pay for his military card.

2.3 Change of modality of military service.

Wilmer David Pérez Pérez was recruited as a holder of a secondary school certificate but afterwards his status was changed for the one of a foot soldier, which means more time in service and increased risks. The switch of his status took place at dawn when soldiers were exercising. Wilmer was deceived and asked to sign a document that he was told would allow the army to resolve his exemption situation sooner. The practice of such a strategy can almost be equated to the use of torture since through persuasion and under extreme exhaustion, individuals are not able to think clearly about the content of the documents they sign.

Hours after being incorporated, the young man Alex Giovanni Quintana Sánchez, holder of a secondary school certificate, was moved to Puerto Carreño in the department Vichada in the modality of regular soldier. Questioning this situation to the commandants, Alex started to receive physical and psychological maltreat, for which his family sent various petitions to different military and national authorities to ask for a transfer to Bogotá and a better treat or his release from the barrack because of his condition of displaced. Thanks to the pronouncement of the Constitutional Court, his was retreated - after 6 months - form the active service, and he expressed his interest in demanding the State for having ignored his rights. [13]

2.4. Indigenous people and minors in the barracks.

One of the official sources that permit tracing irregularities in recruitment is the 2005 General Census.

Four hundred and forty-seven indigenous people are registered in garrisons or barracks. In spite of their legal exemption[14], members of indigenous communities continue to be subjected to recruitment by the Colombian State. In 2003, Congressman Jesús Piñacué Achicué made this a public notice: at that moment were around 150 indigenous people providing military service[15]. This means that between 2003 and 2005 the amount of conscripted indigenous increased by three times.

Furthermore, in the 2005 General Census, there were 973 minors registered as living in garrisons or barracks. A portion of this population could be explained by the fact that there are households located in housing designed for the armed forces, explaining the presence of individuals between the ages of 0 to 16. However, 342 of these persons are 17 years old, which gives us reason to question the practice of irregular recruitment of minors.[16]

The 2005 General Census attempts to cover the total population and is a highly regarded official document but it is only one of various information sources about the theme of recruitment irregularities. For that reason we're still seeking out and comparing this information with other sources, like the right access information or independent reports of organizations.

population of minors living in barracks and garrisons
Graph. Population of minors living in barracks and garrisons.
Source: DANE Administrative Department of Statistics. General Cense 2005.

2.5. The entrance and permanence in centers of higher education.

Since May 2006 the centers of higher education require the presentation of the military card to register oneself for the first time or to continue your studies in the institution. Those who don't have the military ID card are obligated to sign a "free and spontaneous" certification of commitment in which they commit themselves to resolve their military situation during the semester.

Universities were asked to demand these illegal and unconstitutional requirements by the National Recruitment Direction by means the official document 006 DISCOR Z4 DIM 27 S1 155 of May 19th of 2006 violates Article 84 of the Constitution[17] and Decree 111 of the decree-law 2150 of 1995[18].

Martín Rodríguez won a case against the state arguing against the requirement of the military card to enter the National University in Medellín, defending conscientious objection and pointing out Article 111 of the Decree-law 2150 of 1995[19]. Despite this victory, centers of higher education continue violating this right in their administrative processes, which affects the right for higher education. Elías Stucky Byler, member of the Mennonite Church and conscientious objector presented the conclusions of the court in Medellín to the National University in Bogotá. The answer he received was the following: "The Registrar's Office requires the presentation of a military ID card to all those who have been admitted as an undergraduate, as stipulated by Article 41, issue of the Law 48 de 1993 "All public, mixed, and private entities, centers or institutions for higher or technical education that enroll or accept individuals who have not defined their status with regards to military service [will be] subjected to sanctions. The response quoted Article 36 of Law 48 of 1993, a norm which was modified in 1995, by Article 111 of the Decree-law 2150, omitting the obligation to present a military ID card or a provisional military ID card in order to register for the first time at any center for higher education.

This clarifies that the practice of requiring a military ID card for enrollment or continuance at centers of higher education, as well as making enrollment conditional after signing a certificate of commitment to service, are both violations of Article 36 of Recruitment Law and therefore, both the Recruitment Division and the educational center are committing an illegal action.

Strategy of accompaniment for conscientious objectors and young people at risk of recruitment

During the last year, the work of the Collective Action of Conscientious Objectors has focused on the construction of a strategy of accompaniment for conscientious objectors and young people at risk of recruitment, which consists of:

1. The construction of 'affinity groups', formed by persons who are at risk for recruitment or don't have the military ID card. These groups are in charge of:

  • designing strategies of mutual protection and communication to confront recruitment,
  • developing judicial and political actions that denounce recruitment and demand the recognition of the right for conscientious objection, and
  • systematize their cases in a database, which states their judicial situation regarding military service.

We call them 'affinity groups' because the people who participate in them face a common problem and are able to build trust that will allow them to have permanent contact and assume mutual responsibility.

2. Legal advising for young people who don't want to do military service and who were illegally recruited or discriminated against for not having the military ID card. This aims:

  • to search for legal and political alternatives for the development of conscientious objection in Colombia, based on the analysis of the national and international legislation and its application to the Colombian context,
  • to accompany and advise the members of the affinity groups in developing legal actions, taking into account the specific characteristics of each case,
  • to give assistance to other young people who don't want to serve in the military or who were illegally recruited,
  • to develop training and workshops and pedagogical materials about legal procedures and judicial tools that can be used at the national and international level.

The legal advising group also manages an emergency fund for young people in risk of recruitment.

3. The construction of a national and international support network to be in charge of:

  • diffusing information about the context of militarization and the situation of conscientious objection in Colombia,
  • exercising political pressure and organizing actions with national and international organizations in cases of forced recruitment and violations against conscientious objectors,
  • following up and supporting the actions organized by Colombian objectors.

4. Psycho-social accompaniment for conscientious objectors and their social environment (i.e. family, friends, college, university, organization) to:

  • Deepen the understanding of the implications that practicing conscientious objection can have at the individual level and for those in his/her social environment
  • Strengthen the social network of the conscientious objectors.

The accompaniment of at-risk young people and conscientious objectors must consider an integral strategy of direct nonviolent action, such as

  • there exists a permanent relationship between the different entities and each one of these is essential for the development of the others
  • we want to change the current situation of conscientious objection in Colombia and affect the structures of power that support these practices of recruitment by developing strategies based on the judicial and political actions that the members of the affinity groups develop as a result of some cases and the task of distributing information and raising awareness about the problem behind recruitment,

After a deep analysis on their personal stance, each one of the members of the pilot affinity group developed a personal campaign of judicial and political actions oriented to helping others define their military situation and to facilitate the exploration of different judicial-political possibilities, which could turn into concrete alternatives for recruitment.

With this motive, the members of the affinity group have generated official communications with military districts and universities, they have systematized their histories as conscientious objector and written their declarations of conscientious objection, which were published in the web page of the War Resisters' League International and will be handed over to the public agencies which are relevant to the guarantee and recognition of the right to conscientious objection, according to the interests of each of the campaigns.

The legal analysis and the political alternatives, developed by the legal assistance, have proved that legal actions concerning normative Colombian law have been exhausted and that the constitutional ground is the place where demands need to be focused in order to guarantee the right to conscientious objection.

The military ID card and interventions in civil life

The military ID card is a military document that controls the civilian life of citizens on behalf of the military institution. The most notorious restrictions placed on civilian life by the military ID card are those that affect the right to education and the right to work. Due to these tight controls, insubordinates and those who refuse to pay the price for military compensation are situated in what we refer to as a 'civilian death' till the age of 50.

Seeking to reduce the effects of the military ID card on civilian life, by changing the way in which it restricts social movement or by completely negating this requirement, is strategic to the development of nonviolent resistance in Colombia, because if eliminated, it would allow for the right to exercise conscientious objection without the need to amend the Constitutional Article concerning the liberty of conscience. Moreover, it would allow the CO movement to bring together the vulnerable population who does not have the military ID card with like-minded groups who either have the card or are not required to have the card (women) and seek to support actions aimed at dismantling this instrument of control.

As an act of symbolic support to those who don't possess the military ID card and therefore are unable to obtain their official degree at the National University, Carlos Gutiérrez presented a letter to the Faculty of Human Sciences of the National University headquartered Bogotá, informing them that Article 13 of Decree 2150 of 1995 exempted him from presenting a copy of the military ID card to graduate.

This action was intended to call the University's attention to the injustice of this requirement, which is unconnected with the academic fulfillment of graduation requirements and argues that even though Mr. Gutiérrez had a military ID card he should have the right to refrain from using it in the present.

This action provides an example of the ways in which persons who have or are not required to have a military ID card can support those who don't in order to expand the movement that seeks to change these restrictions for those who are immediately and adversely affected because they do not have this document.

Carlos Gutiérrez also presented his declaration of conscientious objection to the Ministry of Social Protection in order to call their attention to the discrimination and non-fulfillment of international conventions and national labor legislation by requiring the military ID card in order to gain employment.

Nevertheless, the answer from the Ministry of Social Protection has been ambiguous and evasive, as they don't answer the concerns raised in his declaration of conscientious objection and instead transfer the issue, which concerns their area of expertise, to a department that has nothing to do with the questions surrounding the right to work, the Ministry of Defense.

The next step in this case is to file a case against the state that brings into question the Constitutional Article regarding the law of recruitment that forbids hiring persons who don't have an officially defined military status, focusing on this law's restriction of the conscientious objectors' rights to equality, liberty of conscience and the right to work.


[1] Interview with General Carlos Arturo Suárez Bustamante. Commandant of the Brigade XIII of the Army of Bogotá.
[2] The called Safety equipments are different places that are built to increase the number of people into de police, or the military presence into the sectors. The most common safety equipments are the police stations, communication battalions, and operational military control, infantry battalions, immediate attention centers (CAI) and the permanent units of Justice (UPJ).
[3] In the development of the pedagogical process in Conscientious Objection, that is running actually, in three schools located in San Cristobal, it was importantly noticed that to he question ¿how you see yourself in 1n years? Question made to 184 a adolescents students from the four last secondary grades, it was found that 26 boys wanted to be policemen, and 17 boys and girls who wanted to study something related to the military issue, criminality mainly.
[4] This number considers the expenses in security as: public forces, electronical security, private security, and insurance related to security.
[5] Bogotá Comptroller. An Economic-Financial study of the Security in Bogotá. 2006.
[6] Literary Source: Bogotá´s Metropolitan Police
[7] Literary Source: National Army
[12] Because of the pressure of the commanders of the battalion of services 13, the boy refused to continue with the development of his case for the immediate release from the barrack.
[13] Carlos Gutiérrez. Member of the Collective Action of Conscientious Objectors. Niños y grupos étnicos en los cuarteles: los datos del censo general 2005. Bogotá, octubre 2007.
[14] Ley 48 de 1993, of article 27 Exenciones en todo tiempo: Los indígenas que residan en su territorio y conserven su integridad cultural, social y económica.
[15] Gaceta del Congreso. No. 653 del viernes 5 de diciembre de 2003, página 18.
[16] En la legislación interna, mediante lo dispuesto en el articulo 2 de la ley 548 del 23 diciembre de 1999, "por medio de la cual se prorroga la vigencia de la ley 418 del 26 de diciembre de 1997 y se dictan otras disposiciones", se modificó el articulo 13 de la ley 418, estableciéndose que los menores de 18 años de edad no serán incorporados a filas para la prestación del servicio militar, eliminando la alternativa de permitir el reclutamiento de los estudiantes de undécimo grado que resultaran elegidos para la prestación del servicio, si voluntariamente y con la autorización expresa y escrita de sus padres, "optaban por el cumplimiento inmediato de su deber constitucional" (Ley 418, artículo 13).
[17] Artículo 84 de la CN: "Cuando un derecho o una actividad hayan sido reglamentados de manera general, las autoridades públicas no podrán establecer ni exigir permisos, licencias o requisitos adicionales para su ejercicio".
[18] In this decree the requirement to present the military card to enroll for the first time at the university is forbidden and it only mentions some situations of the civil life in which it will be asked for, and the enrollment at the university or the signature of certificates of commitment to continue studying in the higher education centers don't appear.
[19] Tribunal superior Medellín, sala de decisión penal. Acción de tutela de segunda instancia -0683-2006 (013) 2007. Febrero 26 de 2007.